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Abstract
A centralistic government model has become a trend in a number of developing countries,
in which the ideosycretic aspect becomes pivotal key in the policy making. The situation
constitutes authoritarianism, cronyism, and corruption. To break the impasse, the decen-
tralized system is proposed to make people closer to the public policy making. Decentrali-
zation is also convinced to be the solution to create a good governance. But a number of
facts in the developing countries demonstrates that decentralization indeed has ignite
emerges backfires such as decentralized corruption, parochialism, horizontal conflict,
local political instability and others. This article elaborates the theoretical framework on
decentralization’s ouput as the a double-edge knife. In a simple words, the concept of
decentralization does not have a permanent relationship with the creation of good gover-
nance and development. Without substantive democracy, decentralization is indeed po-
tential to be a destructive political instrument threating the state’s future.
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Abstrak
Model pemerintahan sentralistik telah menjadi trend di sejumlah negara berkembang, di
mana aspek ideosinkretik menjadi faktor dominan dalam penentuan kebijakan publik.
Besarnya dominasi pemimpin dalam pola sentralistik itu seringkali berbuah
otoritarianisme, kolusi, dan korupsi yang akut. Untuk memecah kebuntuan tersebut,
maka sistem desentralisasi dihadirkan untuk lebih mendekatkan rakyat dengan proses
pengambilan kebijakan publik. Desentralisasi juga diyakini menjadi kunci bagi
terciptanya tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik. Tetapi sejumlah fakta di negara
berkembang menunjukkan bahwa desentralisasi justru menimbulkan bumerang berupa
suburnya korupsi di tingkat lokal, parokhialisme, konflik horisontal, instabilitas politik
lokal dan lainnya. Artikel ini mengelaborasi penelusuran kerangka teoritik tentang out-
put desentralisasi yang ibarat pisau bermata dua. Singkat kata, konsep desentralisasi
tidak memiliki relasi permanen dengan terciptanya tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik
(good governance). Desentralisasi juga berpotensi menjadi instrumen destruktif bagi
kelangsungan sebuah pemerintahan.
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Introduction
Anthony Giddens in his The Third Way
and Its Critics (2000:129) critically asserts
that the fundamental problems of the third
world countries “don’t come from the global
economy itself, or from the self-seeking be-
havior on the part of the richer nations. They
lie mainly in the societies themselves in au-
thoritarian government, corruption, conflict,
over-regulation and the low level of women
emancipation”. The realities weaken the in-
stitutions of democracy and mechanisms of
political accountability in the developing
countries. Conceptually, by bringing power
closer to people in the local levels, the public
sector reform can be easily achieved to set
up good governance for local ‘social well-
being’ (McIntyre, 2003). That is why decen-
tralization has been widely presented as an
efficacious prescription for poverty in poor
and developing countries (Colongan, 2003;
Hofmann and Kaiser, 2002; USAID, 2006).
Conversely, plenty of experts are also
pessimistic in capturing the correlation be-
tween decentralization and the local gover-
nance establishment leading to development
(Crook and Manor, 1998; Moore and Putzel,
1999). They argue that, particularly in pa-
tron-client society cases, decentralization
which is purposed to disperse central
government’s power and authority to local
level precisely often empower local powerful
elites making people dependent upon them
and encouraging pseudo-democracy which
consequently perpetuate poverty and dis-
parities (Faucher, 2005; Schiller, 2002; van
Klinken, 2002; Crook and Sverrison, 2001:
37). In that level, McIntyre (2005) has also
reminded that democracy potentially does
not represent the interests of citizens.
By using political approach, this paper
is going to critically asses the debate about
public sector reform trough decentralization
system, while the Pierre and Peters’ (2000)
and Kjaer’s (2004) ideas will be used for the
point of departure. Does decentralization al-
ways successfully lead to democracy as the
base of good governance? Why, in many
cases, decentralization tends to be stagnant
without glaring achievements in local eco-
nomic growth or social welfare? If we point
the quality of democracy as the main prob-
lem resisting governance while the political
participation remains high, then why a ‘sub-
stantive democracy’ frequently disappear in
the decentralized system? First of all, atten-
tion is going to be focused on the conceptual
explanation of iron triangle of decentraliza-
tion in democratization perspective, gover-
nance, and development’s relations, and then
followed by the broader elaboration of the
particular successful and failed cases of de-
centralization.
However, the writer strongly argues the
triangle of decentralization, democracy and
development in public sector does not have
an entirely consistent relation. The numer-
ous facts of either failed or successful decen-
tralization exhibit both optimism and pessi-
mism in its implementation resulting diverse
implications for the political changes. As
stated by Crook and Manor (1998: 304) that
decentralization cannot guarantee to im-
prove the local governance and accountabil-
ity of local leaders. Simply, decentralization
will be really meaningful only when the sub-
stantive democracy exists within both the
realm of state apparatus and society (Ostrom,
1991; Oyugi, 2000). The existence of ‘substan-
tive democracy’ is commonly signaled by an
independent judiciary, free press, systems of
transparency and accountability, freedom of
association and speech which are strength-
ened by a democratic behaviour in which the
majority of society qualitatively has a good
political awareness and knowledge to prolif-
erate public decision using rational political
considerations (Putzel, 1997). Without that,
the irony of decentralization would emerge
the failed democracy leading to the political
decay and perpetuating local economic in-
equalities.
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The Convincing Promises of Decen-
tralization
Pierre and Peters (2000: 16) perceived
market globalization has reduced nation-
state sovereignty and autonomy. The situa-
tion has been responded by the nation-state
by developing transnational institutions and
organizations such as European Union (EU),
WTO, and others to control vast economic
resources. But Pierre and Peters are still fully
conscious that nation-state remains the key
political actor to express collective interests
of grassroots. To streamline its function, na-
tion-state is suggested to transform its role
from constitutional-centralistic to the coor-
dinative and fusion governmental system
(Pierre and Peters, 2000: 25; Evans, 1997;
Payne, 2000).
In this level, the concept of decentrali-
zation has been convinced as one of the best
models to set up governance (Pierre and Pe-
ters, 2000: 88). The decentralized manage-
ment model is perceived effective to pursuit
collective interests and to address grassroots’
complicated problems, while the hierarchi-
cal-centralistic model is believed to be “too
big to solve the small problems and too small
to solve the big problems” (Bell, 1987; Pierre
and Peters, 2000: 27, 89).1 Decentralization
is also viewed as the effective and responsive
system to reform public sector management
for delivering the better public services which
is often underestimated by the centralistic
model of government.2 That is in line with
Geertz’s (2004) suggestion that states are con-
structed to assert sovereign rights and to serve
public interests.
In the centralistic system, various au-
thoritarian governments are able to consoli-
date the power of patrimonial regime to con-
trol potential resources from locals to the
hands of elites. The authoritarians often en-
force their decisions and policies down to the
local level make provincial, district, subs-dis-
trict and village levels lose their roles.
Whereas the centrally administration is a
conducive nature for corruption and collu-
sion in which states are potentially hijacked
by the hands of destructive clique (Hadiz,
2004; World Bank, 2000; Lal, 2000). By frag-
menting the central government’s power and
authority, decentralization is expected to be
solution to establish a democratic local gov-
ernment where citizens will have rights and
opportunities to express their demands on
their state (Pierre and Peter, 2000: 88;
Arghiros, 2001; Bardhan, 2002: 188).
The democratic decentralization needs
the implementation of periodic elections as
the democratic process providing more space
for people’s contestation, self-determination
and evaluation on government. Schiller
(2009: 150) and Mietzner (2009: 126) argue
that election is an effective political instru-
ment to support or to delegitimize govern-
ment to create radical social and political
changes. Fukuyama (2004) also suggests that
every public decision should be taken from
1 The implementation of decentralization has been
conducted in most of the advanced democracies
like France, the United States, the Scandinavian
countries as well as the Netherlands for a couple
last decades. The concept of decentralization has
been then developed by international financial in-
stitutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank for being imposed to the
poor and developing countries as one of the pre-
condition requirements to access loans. The basic
idea is strongly correlated with the neo-liberal con-
cept. Some are suspicious that the decentraliza-
tion concept is part of the economically powerful
governments to ‘fine-tune’ the global economy.
Kjaer (2004) for example, admits that the interna-
tional financial institutions and donors are able to
significantly influence the states’ domestic politics
and weaken governments by introducing economic
reforms and new political concept to access the
states’ recourses, which he called then as the
“transnational reciprocity and exchange” (Kjaer,
2004: 165).
2 Pierre and Peter (2000: 87) use the experience of
Western Europe and the United States in the 1960s
as the convincing example. In that case, these coun-
tries conducting centralistic model tended to be
slower and irresponsive in targeting the public ser-
vice problems, while the sub-national governments
showed themselves as the capable and aggres-
sive actors in delivering the better public service.
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the lowest possible level. By accommodating
the grassroots’ voices, election will determine
the will of people, to rotate leadership by giv-
ing a mandate and legitimacy to elected lead-
ers for change key policies and government’s
directions.
The democratically elected leaders are
then expected to improve public sector man-
agement and also the local state’s self-iden-
tity to demolish cultures of discrimination
commonly faced by minority groups by set-
ting up productive dialogue for social well-
being in the local level (McIntyre, 2003: 497).
Bardhan (2002) is also in line with McIntyre
(2003) by arguing that decentralization will
open up the possibility for minorities and
ender-represented groups in market and
state to more actively and accountably par-
ticipate in the administration’s policy mak-
ing process.
 Before discussing the role of democracy
in the decentralized system further, it needs
to be underlined that decentralization is not
a determinant of democracy, but the instru-
ment of democracy. Decentralization can run
well if local participation and accountability
can discipline political leaders, business ele-
ments, and other local stakeholders. By dis-
ciplining them, public policies will be sterile
from vote-buying, bribery, and other corrup-
tion practices.
 In another word, democracy is the “soul
of decentralization”. Without democracy,
legal reforms and the healthy economic es-
tablishment programs would never have
achieved. As stated by Amartya Sen (1999)
that “political rights, including freedom of
expression & discussion, are not only pivotal
in inducing social response to economic
needs, they are also central to the
conceptualization of economic needs them-
selves” (Amartya Sen, 1999). Thus, political
enlightenment and healthy economic growth
can be develop together within the frame-
work of democratic decentralization. Since
the democratic regional autonomy is also
able to produce transparency, proper politi-
cal and bureaucratic supervision, as well as
reforms in various sectoral policies, and they
must be continuously maintained to assure
clean and lean governance in local level.
The next question is whether decentrali-
zation is able to guarantee in emerging de-
mocracy? If democracy is measured by us-
ing parameter of increasing people partici-
pation in the political matters, decentraliza-
tion may guarantee of democracy. But, if the
exits of democracy is viewed qualitatively as
the emergence of the culture of accountabil-
ity, it is strongly conceived decentralization
cannot always lead to democracy (Crook and
Sverrison, 2001; Rahman, 2001; Johnson,
2001: 524). Moreover, several authoritarian
and interventionist states without and less
democracy in their governmental system
such as Singapore, Taiwan, as well as South
Korea are also proven able to perform their
development and welfare as well.
Then, the next critical question is what
kind of democracy needed by the system of
decentralization? Because every govern-
ment, no matter how patrimonial and au-
thoritarian like Singapore, frequently claim
as democratic. Indonesia under Suharto’s
regime also did the same thing, in which
Liddle (1997) labeled it as ‘pretended democ-
racy’, while others classify it as ‘predatory
democracy’ (Robinson, 2002), ‘façade or
pseudo democracy’ (Haynes, 2001: 5), and
‘patrimonial democracy’ (Webber, 2006)
without performing an effective administra-
tion (McLeod, 2005) and absence of substan-
tive and spirit democracy (Aspinall, 2005).
Decentralization needs a substantive democ-
racy emphasizing on the existence of demo-
cratic behavior hold by the state actors and
elements of society, rather than on the estab-
lishment of democratic institutions and
mechanisms only. Democratic behavior is the
fuel of democracy. When the society has
enough political awareness and knowledge
strengthening rational political consider-
83
ations, the betrayal of state apparatus on
democracy can be avoided.
That is why, when the system of decen-
tralization has been implemented, but not
supported yet by the enough democratic
behavior, it will potentially emerge the phe-
nomena of the ‘shadow state’ or “the emer-
gence of rulers drawing authority from their
abilities to control markets and their mate-
rial rewards” (Reno, 1995: 1; Harris White,
1999). The shadow state as the irony of de-
centralization occurs in many contexts such
as in Sieera Leone, Africa, Bolivia, Colom-
bia, West Bengal, several locals in India, in-
cluding in several provinces in Indonesia
(Crook and Sverrisson, 2001: 37; Johnson,
2001: 525).
 The substantive democracy itself can be
achieved by implementing political educa-
tion through political and democratic events.
By conducting election democratically, the
function of political education can be con-
tinually conducted for people, candidates,
parties, and every element of societies. (2004:
160) believes the implementation of demo-
cratic elections will improve degree of
civicness or Putnam (1994) called as the “so-
cial capital”. Since the democratic elections
will provide adequate political education to
set up sustainable trust, norms, values, and
networks which are crucial for society to con-
duct coordinated reformed actions efficiently
and effectively (, 1994: 167; Fukuyama,
2004).
Because of that, decentralization in
Karnataka and Kerala, India for instance, by
Manor and Crook (1998: 302-4) in their com-
parative study in South Asian and West Af-
rican countries, as the successful decentrali-
zation while others are failed. The key an-
swer of the phenomena is located on the
availability of social capital which is repre-
sented by a culture of accountability within
the society which is constituted by competi-
tive political parties, freedom of press, active
civil society, and others. Thus, the quality of
political education must be improved gradu-
ally to perform the culture of accountability as
the basic capital of successful decentralization.
Decentralization as the Two-Edged Knife
Bunte (2009: 113) admits that the twin
processes of decentralization and democratiza-
tion raise various effects. Beside the economic
growth, social welfare, political accountability
and infrastructure development in the good
side, decentralization also potentially shapes
decentralized corruption, collusion, political
violence, parochialism and other side effects
weakening the state. In case of corruption,
slowly but sure, the practice experienced
diasporas from the central to local governments
and shifted horizontally once many agents had
become involved. Treisman (2000) called the
phenomena as the “overgrazing the com-
mons”. Moreover, in the transition phase from
centralistic-corrupt regime to decentralized-
democratic administration, as admitted by
Heyden (1999) and Kjaer (2004), the state is
potentially trapped on the uncertain future like
what happened in Thailand, Philippines and
Indonesia’s democratic transitions.3
For instance, while the democratic be-
havior is weak, parochialism as one of the
3 The situation has been experienced by some South-
east Asian countries for instance. In Philippine, the
system of decentralization has been implemented
after the demise of highly authoritarian regime in
1986. Because of the inability of dominant ones to
continue their reformist interests, the system then
re-established political clans dominating represen-
tative bodies and local governments (Rood, 1998;
Hutchcroft, 1998). In Thailand, the 1997 Constitu-
tion has called greater development of decentral-
ized governance. But, because of the reformists
inability to articulate their voices, political corrup-
tion indeed developed rapidly. The similar thing
happens in Indonesia after the Soeharto authori-
tarian regime toppled; decentralization has been
conducted to improve economic growth, society
welfare, political accountability and infrastructure
development. But in the same time, decentraliza-
tion also shapes decentralization of corruption, col-
lusion, political violence, parochialism and other
side effects weakening the state (Bunte, 2009: 113;
Faucher, 2005; Schiller, 2002; van Klinken, 2002;
Crook and Sverrison, 2001: 37).
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side effects of decentralization potentially
rises, in which the sentiment of ethnicity is
significantly performed in the local political
contestation (Smith, 2002: 390). The paro-
chial mobilization also potentially tends to
be primordial even separatist, it is able to
threat the unity of nations. Moreover if the
central government does not maintain the
political communication as well, it would be
more nationally destructive. When it occurs,
the result of decentralization can be catego-
rized as an over-exaggerated one.
Horizontal and communal conflicts also
often emerge as implication of the rising
primordialism in the regional autonomy and
administrative fragmentation (Bunte, 2009;
Hadiz, 2003, Honna, 2006; Schiller, 2002,
Malley, 2003). It is frequently worsened by
the involvement of local gangsters collabo-
rating with local leaders and elite parties
colouring the local democracy with violence,
intimidation, discrimination and riots. The
situation is called by Bunte (2009) as ‘big
bang decentralization’ haunting state with
more rooted corruption, a weak rule of law,
a limited state capacity, and society disorder.
The pathological situation is indeed not
conducive for local development since the
public policies are more colored by the con-
frontation of elites’ vested interests than the
struggle for people welfare. Moreover, in the
democratic cases, decentralization also can
itself create new problems, in which the high
participatory politics is able to multiply de-
mands on the administration making pub-
lic policies ineffective. The more significant
economic disparities and poor population of
the country, the more contradictions and the
more ineffective the administration policies
and approaches (Luckman, 2000: 36). Ac-
cording to the Deprivation Theory (Gurr,
1970), the raising expectations without off-
set by an increase in capacity and capabil-
ity, will make people frustrated, commit acts
of violence, even a revolution that leads to
self-determination struggles. That is towards
decentralization.
To deal with the situation, Hyden (2004:
191) more emphasizes on the creation and
maintenance of a system of rules, rather than
the process of democracy.4 The system of
rules is perceived able to govern the public
realm and regulate how the elements of state,
civil society and market can work synergis-
tically (Kjaer, 2004: 165).5 Even though the
legitimacy of rules changes up and down ir-
regularly, Hyden still believes that the chal-
lenges can be overcome when the elements
of society can be conferred authority to
make rules and exercise power for improv-
ing the democratic governance and maintain
the rules legitimacy.6 After the political com-
munities in a cross-border context accept
rules as legitimate, they are motivated to
enthusiastically comply these rules by an
internal sense of obligation rather than by
the fear of retribution or self-interested cal-
culation (Kjaer, 2004: 164; Hurd, 1999).
4 In analyzing the regime transition, Hyden (1992)
strikingly separates the concepts of governance
and democracy. He convinces democracy which is
strongly associated with dominant Western norms
and values cannot guarantee the improved gov-
ernance. Many democratic countries have indeed
conducted bad governance violating the principle
of fairness, transparency, and accountability. Con-
versely, authoritarian and interventionist states
without and less democracy in their governmental
system such as Singapore, Taiwan, as well as South
Korea indeed proved themselves as capable ac-
tors in performing good governance and showing
their glaring achievements in development.
5 To institutionalize the rules, the rational-legal bu-
reaucracy is strongly needed in the direction-giv-
ing function of rule and to clarify all elements’ roles
and priorities based on clear organizational struc-
tures, procedures, and set of regulations. But, the
rules frequently face challenges related to the rule
adherence and the rule design which is basically
vary based on the social setting and timing.
6 That is why, the legitimacy of rules changes up and
down irregularly (Hyden, 2004: 192; Franck, 1990:
24). In this case, “legitimacy is concerned with the
social construction of inter-subjective beliefs in a
defined political community and will be rooted in
accepted norms of social justice in forms of demo-
cratic accountability of decision-maker to those
affected prevail” (Underhill, 2008: 537)
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In that level, Hyden convinces that gov-
ernance will be well established, and then
just needs trust, reciprocity, and accountabil-
ity to strengthen the foundation of social
capital and civil society for better governance
realm.7 Without that, decentralization is go-
ing to be failed. Even though local govern-
ments are set politically stronger up by mak-
ing the systems closer to people, the prin-
ciples of governance such as transparency,
accountability, and participation would be
not established well.
‘Informal Governance’ and the Betrayal
of Civil Society
Pierre and Peter (2000: 89) convince that
decentralization can empower urban regimes
through the coalition between local political
elite and corporate actors. The coalition is
hoped to trigger the local economic develop-
ment and better public service delivery. Both
of them are hoped to work collaboratively,
harmonize their actions and complement
each other since, as generally-known that,
local governments commonly have limited
capacity,8 limited financial resources and con-
strained autonomy.9
But, at the same time, the coalition be-
tween the local corporate actors and politi-
cal elites can change their partnership to be
a ‘destructive coalition’ emerging unlawful
practices which are called by Reno (1995: 3)
and White (1999: 4) as the “informal gover-
nance” or “the emergence of rulers drawing
authority from their abilities to control mar-
kets and their material rewards” (Hidayat,
2009: 125-126). The phenomena have
emerged in many countries such as Sieera
Leone, Africa, Bolivia, Colombia, West Ben-
gal, other several locals in India, including
in several provinces in Indonesia (Crook and
Sverrisson, 2001: 37; Johnson, 2001: 525).
The informal governance is usually prac-
ticed by the state apparatus, local elites or
politicians who need money as the political
capital for local elections and other political
contestations, by inviting investors, business-
men or other corporate actors to join into the
network of informal governance. After re-
ceiving the money for political funding from
the corporate actors, the elites or state actors
will provide a political and legal protection
formally for the corporate actors based on
particular deals to run various beneficial
grand projects of infrastructures, natural re-
sources explorations, or laxness of tax collec-
tion, enforced privatization of state assets,
and others. Then, the state actors and the
political investors spending much money for
the political contestation will rationally try
to return the cost of their political and eco-
nomic investments by extracting and explor-
ing the local resources through the projects.
The situation will emerge manipulation of
public policies emphasizing on the vested
7 That is why Hyden (1992: 7) defines governance as
“the conscious management of regime structure
with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the pub-
lic realm”.
8 The government’s limited capacity may be caused
by the complicated demands of society. Since theo-
retically, decentralization also can itself create new
problems, in which the high public participation in
politics can multiply demands on the administra-
tion making public policies ineffective and inca-
pable. The more significant economic disparities
and poor population of the country, the more con-
tradictions and the more ineffective the adminis-
tration policies and approaches (Luckman, 2000:
36).
9 Pierre and Peter (2000: 18) give the example of con-
strained autonomy suffered not only developing
countries, but also happen in developed countries,
in which the half-hearted decentralization has been
implemented. For instance, “In Britain, the state-
local relationships remained contested and
politisized and central government still exercise
tight political control over local authorities (Gold-
smith and Newton, 1993); some ideas of the labour
government, for example the increasing use of
audits (Power, 1997), are tanding to centralize
power evenmore similiarly, in German, although
the federal government has withdrawsome con-
trol over public services, allowing for greater re-
gional and local control (Derlien, 1995), it is pos-
sible that the federal government, if it so chooses,
can resume such delegated powers”.
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interests and ignoring the basic needs of or-
dinary people or society.
The dependency of the state actors on
the informal governance makes the local
administration powerless, in which the ap-
paratus day to day tends to be totally un-
der-controlled by outsiders’ authorities. Their
loyalty and dedication will be handed over
to the informal authorities rather than to the
state and society. Furthermore, the nature of
economic-political transaction becomes more
popular among parties, candidates, and po-
litical investors in which every political pro-
cess is monetized. To gain the political fund-
ing, local politicians also try to corruptively
extract local government’s budget weaken-
ing the public sector management. The “cre-
ative” politicians often perform the innova-
tive strategy of engineering civic protest
against government by mobilizing people in
order to access local government’s budget
and resources (Hadiz, 2003; Aspinall and
Fealy, 2004; Erb, Sulistiyanto and Faucher,
2005; Sakai, 2002). At this level, the power of
money performs its role in the political sys-
tem resulting bad governance 10 and ‘pre-
tended democracy’.
The pathological situation can be con-
trolled by strengthening critical ‘civil society’
to deliver political pressures continually.11 The
collectively massive pressure is able to demol-
ish the network and practices of informal
governance or the ‘shadow state’ phenom-
enon. Ironically, the elements of civil society
are also frequently weakened by the ‘forbid-
den network’ trough money politics.12 The
situation has been identified by Rodan (1996:
4-5) and White (1994) arguing that civil so-
ciety may be profoundly anti-democratic or
anti-market. Kjaer (2004: 160) also realizes
that civil society is not always democratic and
even able to marginalize other groups en-
tirely from participation in the public sphere.
Kjaer gives examples of several non-govern-
ment organizations may be more motivated
by the opportunities to access funding rather
than to promote the common interests in the
public realm. That is what the writer calls as
the ‘betrayal of civil society’ which is very
dangerous for the future of democracy, gov-
ernance, and development of state and soci-
ety.
Rising Optimism of Decentralization
for Good Governance
Although Florini (2003) and Hyden
(2004) have critiqued some weak points of
democracy, but they do not favor leaving
democracy. Florini and Hyden still believe
in democracy as the ‘best worst option’ to run
the nation-state. Florini in particular optimis-
tically convinces the transparency and ac-
1 0 By referring to the World Bank’s definition, Kjaer
(2004) defines the bad governance term as the situ-
ation to denote corruption and patronage practices
in the public services of developing countries
(World Bank, 1989).
1 1 Kjaer (2004: 158) argued that civil society is one of
the most important elements for democracy. The
civil society terminology refers to an “intermedi-
ate associational realm between state and family
populated by organizations which are separate
from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the
state and are formed voluntarily by members of
society to protect and advance their interests or
values (White, 1996: 182)”. On the other hand, Hadiz
(2004: 701) explains civil society from the neo-insti-
tutionalist perspective, in which civil society is de-
fined as “the homogeneous, common set of fun-
damental interests, bound together by the nurtur-
ing of social capital. While these interests are of-
ten tacitly understood to favour free markets, rule
of law, and democracy –and are thus basically as-
sociated with the vibrant and independent middle
class or bourgeoisie—such a view cannot account
for the competing interests within civil society it-
self”.
1 2 In Indonesia’s experience (Hidayat, 2009), the prac-
tice of money politics spreads over the grassroots
level, involving the patrons who are politically in-
fluential to change ordinary people’s political main-
streams and affiliations. In developing countries,
money politics has become an effective instrument
to mobilize constituents. When people as the ba-
sic element of society are politically contaminated,
they will be not critical anymore. As a result, the
democratic behavior tends to be blunt and decay
lacking check and balance system in the local ad-
ministration.
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countability will be part of the coming de-
mocracy, supported by high participation,
beyond voting in elections. Regarding to the
decentralization implementation, even
though decentralization has caused the irony
of democracy and lack of good governance
in some cases, but many still agree with
Florini’s optimism that democracy presented
by decentralization is a very good strategy
to set up good governance in the local level
(Haynes, 2001; Bardhan, 2002).
The ironic phenomena of decentraliza-
tion are viewed as a just temporal shock
which can be overcome by engaging, edu-
cating and empowering people to enhance
the basic principle of democracy. In the pe-
riod of transition towards democracy, all ele-
ments of the state and society must be care-
ful to escort and to win the democratic tran-
sition which is highly vulnerable to conflict,
reconstituting status quo power hijacking the
new democratic institutions, or even the state
disintegration.13 The transition towards de-
mocracy is signed by the intensive interac-
tions, confrontations, competitions as well as
the compromising interests among appara-
tus, politicians and other societal actors, while
the political process is less able to perform
the good quality of governance (Kjaer, 2004:
155-157). Thus, simultaneous political edu-
cation and participatory dialogue are defi-
nitely needed. McIntyre has remained that
“the closest we can get to truth is though dia-
logue” (McIntyre, 2000) which is important
to avoid polarization of democracy caused
by misunderstanding, mistrust and mutual
suspicion among democratic actors.
After the political consciousness posed
by the majority of society, the next step is a
consolidation of democracy where both lead-
ers and the people collectively agree that
democratic system is better than any other
alternative (Haynes, 2001: 11; Kjaer, 2004:
160). In this level, still Haynes explain, both
the state apparatus and elites of society are
willing to share power avoiding the nature
of authoritarianism and parochialism, as well
as willing to subordinate their own strategic
objectives and conflict of interests for the com-
mon good interest. The struggle would be
challenged by various barriers such as ex-
cessive executive domination, neo-patrimo-
nial socio-political system, widespread pov-
erty, rooted state-level corruption, unstable
political parties, and complex ethnic and re-
ligious conflicts (Kjaer, 2004: 158; Heynes,
2001).
When the consolidation of democracy
successfully finished, the next step is to rear-
range and change the structure of power in
the both local and national levels to be more
democratic, responsive, and responsible to
the agenda of public sector reform. In this
stage, as Bardhan (2002: 202) suggests, the
state should play its crucial role to mobilize
people to join into the process of local par-
ticipatory development, to neutralize the
power of local oligarchs, to advocate local fi-
nance properly, to support the building local
capacity by assisting them in the technical
and professional levels, to empower a watch-
dog system for public accountability and
others. When the software and hardware of
local good governance can be performed
properly, then decentralization will be mean-
ingful to change pattern of production and
13 The transition theorists, O’Donnell and Schmitter
(1986) often argued that liberal democratic gover-
nance is the benevolent result of a situation in which
conservative hardliners and reformers have re-
spectively failed to gain the upper hand, and there-
fore are inclined toward striking a bargain with each
other, rather than engage in conflict. That is why,
for them, democracy is assumed as the product of
stalemate situation. But in fact, democracy has
required the clear political defeat of the forces of
the status quo regime by pro-democratic reform-
ist interests; otherwise the new pro-status quo re-
gime, which is usually more organized, coherent
and endowed with material resources, will capture
the transition situation by hijacking the new insti-
tutions, discourses, icons, and paraphernalia of
democracy to protect and serve their predatory
interests (McFaul, 2002; Hadiz, 2004).
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accumulation of local economy as the basic
foundation of local development.14
Conclusion
Decentralization is one of the popular
major types of displacement of state power
for strengthening democracy as the pre-con-
dition of good governance. But we have to
be selective in assessing the twin processes of
decentralization and democracy producing
various outcomes and mixed results. Decen-
tralization is not a determinant of democracy,
but the instrument of democracy. Decentrali-
zation can run well if local participation and
accountability can discipline all local politi-
cal, economic and social stakeholders. By
disciplining them, public policies will be ster-
ile from vote-buying, bribery, and other cor-
ruption practices.
Decentralization based on democratic
system is also able to perform its role and
function to generate good governance in the
local level if that is fueled by the ‘substantive
democracy’. The substantive democracy as
the result of adequate social capital will pro-
duce democratic and accountable behaviors
as the basic foundation of decentralization
to gain glaring achievements in the local de-
velopment, public sector management re-
form, and the better local social well-being.
Without proper social capital and sub-
stantive democracy, decentralization will cre-
ate a more rooted corruption, informal gov-
ernance, horizontal conflict, hijacked admin-
istration, political violence, parochialism, or
even disintegration, another side effects
weakening the state. So, the hard work which
must be done by the infant decentralized
regions is how to proliferate agenda of po-
litical education to grow values, trust, norms,
and networks to strengthen democracy and
governance in the local level. Without that,
process of decentralization is going to be
failed.
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